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The Long Road Home:
Protracted Refugee Situations
in Africa
Since the early r99os, the intemational response to refugee emergencies
has focused on delivering humanitarian assistance to war-affected popula-
tions, and encouraging large-scale repatriation programmes in high-profile
regions sudr as the Balkans, the African Great Lakes or, recently, Darfur
and Chad. The majority of today's over rz million refugees, however, are
trapped in protracted refugee situations. Such situations 
- 
often character-
ised by long periods of exile, stretching to decades for some groups 
- 
occur
on most continents in environments ranging from camps to rural settlements
and urban centres. In additioru a large proportion of the world's intemally
displaced people, around z5m (about half of them in Africa), have been
displaced for a decade or mote.'
Protracted refugee populations are a critical element in continuing
conflict and instability. They obstruct peace processes and undermine
attempts at economic development. Recurring refugee flows are also a
source of intemational conflict. They cause instability in neighbouring coun-
tries and trigger intervention; sometimes refugee camps are used as bases
by armed groups that engage in insurgency, resistance and terrorism. The
militarisation of refugee camps creates a security problem for the country of
origin, the host country and the international community. Security concems
such as arms trafficking drug smuggling, trafficking in women and chil-
dreru and the recruitnent of child soldiers and mercenaries arise in camps
hosting long-term refu gees.
In East and WestAfrica SouthAsi4 SoutheastAsi4 the Caucasus, Central
Asia and the Middle East refugees and intemally displaced people remain
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uproote{ unprotected and without any clear prospect of a solution to their
plight The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) esti-
mates that there were 38 protracted refugee situations in zoo3.. These situations
accounted for a total refugee population of 6.2m. With a global refugee popu-
lation of 9.6m at the end of zoo3, over 64"/" of the world's refugees were in
protracted refugee situations. tlNHcRatso estimates thatthe average duration
of major refugee situations 'has increased from nine years in aggj to 17 years at
the end of zoo3'.2 These figures indicate that protracted refugee situations are
both growing in number and lasting longer without being resolved.
The bulk of refugees in these regions 
- 
Somalis, Sudanese, Burundians,
Iraqis, Afghans and Burmese 
- 
come from countries with protracted histories
of conflict and persecution. The physical and economic insecurity that most
of these refugees experience, coupled with a lack of resettlement opportuni-
ties, has led large numbers of asylum seekers and migrants to move on to
Western countries and use illegal means of entry, including smuggling and
trafficking organisations.
Africa hosts the most complex and pressing of these protracted refugee
situations. The majority of the more than three million African refugees
have been in exile for over ten years. These include Sahrawis, Burundians,
Liberians, Eritreans, Somalis and Southern Sudanese.
Kenya and Tanzania have two of the most challenging protracted refugee
situations in Africa.+ Kenya has hosted significant numbers of Somali and
Sudanese refugees since r99r, while Tanzania has hosted hundreds of thou-
sands of refugees fleeing successive wars in Burundi and Rwanda since 1959.
Both the goverrunents and citizens of these host countries have negative
views of refugees, who are associated with problems of security, violence
and crime and are viewed as threats to social cohesion and employment, or
even as posing a threat of insurgenry or terrorism. Such perceptions have
resulted in growing xenophobia and made the host govemments'policies
increasingly popular with the voting public.
A half-century of African refugees
Refugee movements have been a central feature of the continenfs politics since
independence. Large refugee movements resulted not only from the wars of
national liberation in Southern Africa during the r96os and early rgTos,but
also from civil conflict in newly independent states such as Sudan, Rwanda,
Congo and Burundi. All of these conflicts involved spill-over into neigh-
bouring countries,5 which often viewed fleeing refugees as a national security
threat.6 The presence of large numbers of disaffected refugees in border
areas strained relations between sending and receiving states. Throughout
the r96os and early r"97o, Rwanda and Sudan, for example, believed that
rebel groups would exploit refugees who had fled from their home countries.
As these refugee situations became protracted these concems proved to be
justified. Lr the case of Sudan, neighbouring countries became alarmed at the
threats posed to their own intemal security by the presence of Sudanese refu-
gees. On several occasions in the early t96os, the Sudanese military entered
border areas in Uganda and Ethiopi4 seized refugees, and retumed them to
Sudan. Uganda gave direct and indirect assistance to the Sudanese refugees
and rebels. Consequently, relations between Uganda and Sudan came under
severe strain.z By contrast, Rwandan refugees were generously received into
Tanzania in the early r96os.8 Motivated by a strong sense of pan-Africanism,
and recognising the benefits of settling large refugee populations on under-
used land, the Thnzanian govemment under ]ulius Nyerere encouraged
the settlement of the 1959 Rwandan refugees and subsequently, those refu-
gees fleeing conflict in Burundi in ry72. Under Nyerere's ujamaa philosophy,
based on self-reliance and African socialism, the reception and integration
of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi was regarded not only as a means of
highlighting the failures of neighbouring regimes, but also as being in the
interests of regional development.
The majority of African refugees in this period were fleeing wars of national
liberation. Refugees from the Portuguese territories of Angol4 Mozambique
and Guinea-Bissau caused significant security conc€lrts for host states. The
presence of Angolan refugees inZatre (now the Democratic Republic of the
Congo) led Porhrgal to accuse Zanrc of.protecting'terrorists'and of providing
material and moral support as well as safe bases for Angolan rebel move-
ments. Not only did Zaire provide refuge to Angolans fleeing Portuguese
-ilituty campaigns, it also permifted the Angolan govemment-in-exile and
other nationalist organisations to operate within its borders. Likewise, the
Tanzanian govemment under Nyerere supported a number of liberation
movements during the r96os and early r.g7os. The capital Dar es Salaam
was the home for the Organisation of African Ut ig/r Liberation Commiftee,
where most major movements across Africa were represented. The Tanzanian
govemment permitted and encouraged the Mozambican Liberation Front
(FRELIMO) forces to use refugees as resources in their anti-colonial struggle
and to establish bases in Tanzania. In retaliation, Portugal made punitive
incursions, including bombing raids by the Porhrguese air force, against
Tanzaniq and heavily mined the Mozambique-Tanzania border.
The US and USSR gave political and military support to the various
African independence movements in a bid to exert influence. The most direct
means of exerting influence was through assistance to refugee populations,
which contributed to the establishment of semi-permanent settlements across
the continent. Superpower engagement became much more pronounced
following the withdrawal of the Portuguese from their colonies in the mid-
r97os and the escalation of conflict in the Horn of Africa.
By the end of the r97os, through to the mid-r98os, the renewal of East-
West tensions, superpower rivalry and external manipulation of civil conflicb
resulted in massive refugee flows. The superpowers played an important role
in conflicb in Angola, Mozambique and the Hom of Africa 
- 
either by proxy
in an attempt to bolster regional allies, or by expanding regional and ethnic
conflicb into 'intemationalised'civil wars. Moscow and Washington backed
either established regimes in the countries of origin or, more typically, exiled
fighters seeking to overthrow those regimes. Superpower engagement acceler-
ated local ;urns rac€s and prolonged the conflicb, dramatically increasing the
number of refugees in Africa whidr rose to over 4m by ry8o.s These refugee
communities became entrendred for political purposes, as their camps and
settlements benefited from significant material assistance intended to support
one or another faction in the conflict.
Politicisation of refugee problems inAfrica during the r98os precluded an
easy solution to the refugee dilemma. The three traditional solutions 
- 
reset-
tlement, Iocal settlement and integration, and repatriation 
- 
no longer proved
adequate. There were no compelling political or ideolog-
ical reasons for Westem states to resettle large numbers of
refugees from Africa. Moreover, as a result of diminishing
intemational support for long-staying refugee populations,
local settlement began to be perceived by most African host
govemments as politically and economically infeasible.
Finally, neither donor governments nor most countries of
origin had any interest in promoting repatriation. So long as
refugees were engaged in guenilla warfare against enemy
countries, the United States showed little interest in large-
scale retum. Likewise, countries of origin were in no hurry
to facilitate repatriation" particularly when the refugee population partially
consisted of enemies or guerrilla resistance movements.
This situation was compounded by the disengagement of the superpowers
from Africa in the late r98os. This disengagement, coupled with a rising preoc-
cupation with potential refugee flows from Eastem Europe and the Balkans,
led to the neglect of a number of African refugee situations, especially those
resulting from previous proxy wars. Notwithstanding repatriation successes
in Namibia and Mozambique, refugee populations from Angola Burundi,
Ethiopia Somalia and Sudan remained unaddresse4 placing a significant
strain on host governments and communities. Many protracted refugee situa-
tions in Africa today stem from this period. What little assistance was directed
to African states frombilateral donors and international financial institutions
became conditional on democratisation and economic liberalisatiory thereby
putting new pressures on African states and limiting their range of poliry
options. Finally, the changing nature of conflict in Africa coupled with the
lack of engagement of the United States and others following the withdrawal
of US forces from Somalia io rgg3, resulted in new conflicts and a dramatic
escalation in the number of refugees, rising to almost zrr.by the mid-rg9os.'o
There are thus more unresolved refugee situations in Africa today, while
many host states face significant economic and political pressures."
Many host governments draw attention to the problem of small-arms
trafficking and perceive it to be associated with foreign populations, partic-
ularly protracted refugee groups, from adjoining wur-zones or failed states.
As a consequence, mostAfrican govemments have warehoused refugees in
an estimated r7o camps for over a decade, exacerbating local and regional
insecurity. At the same time, tens of thousands of refugees live clandestinely
in urban areas/ avoiding contact with authorities and existing without legal
status." The growing concems of host govemments illustrate why the inter-
national community should address the question of protracted refugee
situations not only as an issue human rights for refugees left in limbo but
also as a rising issue of national and regional security.
Kenya and Tanzania
Kenya has hosted large numbers of refugees as a result of state collapse
in Somalia and continuing civil war in Sudan. The total number of Somali
refugees in Kenya exceeded 4oo,ooo rn ry94 but has been relatively stable
at T35,ooo since 1996. The overwhelming majority of these refugees live in
three camps near the town of Dadaab, in the Northeast Province, approxi-
mately 8okm from the Kenya-Somalia border. During the r99os, these
camps were renowned as the most violent in the world, with rape murder
and armed robbery almost daily occurrences.'3 Violence was also endemic
in the surrounding areas, as bands of. shiftas, or bandits, attacked convoys of
humanitarian relief, aid workers and refugees collecting firewood.
The spill-over of insecurity into the local population in the r99os was exac-
erbated by the influx of weapons brought in by Somali warlords. According
to Kathi Austin, who carried out research at Dadaab during this period,
'Iocal Kenyan police tasked with security were afraid to go into the camps
atnigh! UNHCRand NGO compounds were fenced-in and protected with
enforced curfews; and NGOs had to be escorted to and from the camps to
carry-out their operations'.'4
M*y in the goverrunent in Nairobi perceive the Somali refugee popula-
tion as a security threat, reinforcing the policy of containing them in isolated
refugee camps.'s This perception was reinforced after reported links between
the residents of the Dadaab camps and the terrorist attacks in Kenya in
1998 and zooz. Shortly after the zooz aftack in Mombasa, US intelligence
sources claimed that a Somali-based Islamic organisation called al-Ittihad
al-Islamiya which had links to the al-Qaeda network, was responsible for
the attacks.'6 While this link has subsequently proven to be tenuous, the
perception of Somali refugees as a threat nonetheless remains.
Tanzania hosts a number of refugee populations, induding successive
influxes from Burundi, Rwanda and Zme (now the Democratic Republic
of the Congo). Unlike Kenya's relatively recent experience with refugees,
Tanzania has continuously hosted refugees from neighbouring countries
since gaining independence in ry64. The largest group, totalling some
6c,c,c,cc., is from Burundi. About r8qooo Burundese originate from the
exodus fleeing the ry72 civil war.
Over roo,ooo Burundian refugees who have been living in Kibondo in
western Tanzania since 1993, posing the greatest concerns to Dar es Salaam.'z
Most pressing have been allegations that armed elements from Burundian
rebel groups are based in the c€unps, where they carry out fundraising and
recruitrnent.'E These allegations have been denied by the Tanzanian govern-
ment and steps taken to increase the ability of the local security forces to
screen for armed elements Eunong the refugees. Howeveq, allegations of
rebel activities in camps continue.
The protracted presence of Burundian refugees has led to a prolifera-
tion of small arms, not only in the refugee-populated areas, but also in
large urban areas, especially Dar es Salaam. In September 2oo3, Tanzanian
President Benjamin Mkapa publicly blamed refugees for the increase in
armed crime and trafficking of weapons, and cited this concern as a justifica-
tion for Tanzania's increased restriction on refugees and insistence on early
repatriation. There is also a common belief that the presence of refugees has
led to rises in disease and environmental degradatioru and placed a signifi-
cant strain on local infrastructure and public services. Relations between
refugees and local authorities have deteriorated, and a sense of insecurity
now prevails in refugee-populated areas.
The cunent situation
African states no longer grant liberal asylum as a matter of course.'e Refugees
are no longer viewed as victims of national liberation struggles, and African
solidarity with refugees has been strained. Local populations in refugee-popu-
lated areas feel aggrieved that refugees receive sudr basic services as health care
and primary education while their owrr acc€ss to these basic services has been
cut as a consequence of economic liberalisation. Refugees are seen as a security
concem at the national level, where govemments express concerns about small-
arms proliferation and the spill-over of conflict, and at the local level where
communities see them as the cause of increased crime and insecuity.
Host govemments have responded by increasingly restricting the quan-
tity and quality of asylum on offer. They have dosed borders to new arrivals,
engaged in refoulement, or forced return, and, in exceptional circumstances,
expelled entire refugee populations. Refugees are sent to isolated and inse-
cure border areas and warehoused in dangerous camps until a solution can be
found. Host states have almost universally abdicated responsibility for refu-
gees to international agencies such as LINHCR. Lr exc-hange for opening their
borders to refugees, states like Kenya and Tanzania now stipulate that refu-
gees ftom neighbouring countries will only benefit from temporary asylum,
and must remain in camps until a solution can be found in another country.
The isolation of refugees in camps not only denies them many basic
rights;" it can also compound states'security concems. Refugees in Kenya
and Tanzania are forbidden to leave the carnps and their immediate envi-
rons. It is illegal for refugees in western Tarrzania, for example, to travel
more than 4lcrr from the camps. They are no longer able eam wages in the
surrounding villages and are thus fully dependent on international assist-
ance. Coupled with donor fatigue and frequent interruptions in the delivery
of even basic assistance to the camps, this policy forces some refugees to
turn to illegal activities, ranging from petty theft to prostitution and armed
robbery. This further reinforces states'sense of vulnerability, leading to more
restrictive measures against refugees.
Security implications 
- 
direct and indirect
Some security threats faced by the host states 
- 
spill-over of conflict and the
presence of 'refugee warriors"' 
- 
reflect a direct link between forced migra-
tion and violence, as the migrants themselves are actively engaged in armed
campaigns typically, but not exclusively, against the country of origin.-
Such campaigns can potentially regionalise conflicts and drag host states
into what were previously intra-state conflicts. This played a significant role
in regionalisation of conflict during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold
War, the logic has changed, but the relevance of refugee warriors remains,
something brought home with particular force in the maelstrom of violence
that gripped the Great Lakes region of Central Africa rn ry94n6.
These direct causes of insecurity are best understood within the context of
so-called failed states, as in Somalia and the rise of warlordism, as in the case of
Liberia during the r99os. Armed groups hide behind the humanitarian character
of refugee carnps and settlements, and recmit arnong the disaffected displaced
populations.'3 There is a risk that humanitarian ai{ induding food medical
assistance and other support mechanisms, might be expropriated to support
armed elements. Similarly, gangs and criminal networks may emerge within
displaced and disenfranchised urban refugee populations. These groups take
of the transnational nature of refugee populations, of remittances
from abroad and the marginal existence of urban refugees to further their goals.
Lrboth contexts, refugees provide cnver for illicit activities rangtng from prosti-
tution and people smuggling to hade in small arms, narcotics and diamonds.
The consequences of sudr activities include cross-border attacks on both
host states and countries of origin, and on humanitarian personnel, refugees
and civilian populations. This can lead to serious bilateral and regional polit-
ical and diplomatic tension. Cross-border flows are perceived by host states
as encroachments on their national sovereignty, especially given the tenuous
control of many central governments over their border regions. Finally, the
activities of armed elements among refugee populations not only violate
refugee-protection and human-rights principles, but can constitute threats to
intemational peac€ and security.+ For example, the consequences of training
and armingthe Taliban andmujahadeen inrefugee camps inPakistan (bythu
United States and others) in previous decades highlights the potential threat
to regional and intemational sectrrity posed by refugee warriors.
Both Kenya and Tanzania have raised significant concerns about the
direct security threat posed by long-standing refugee populations. Kenya's
porous borders and its position as a regional diplomatic and commercial
centre made it a target of international terrorist aftacks in 1998, with the
bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi, and in zooz, with attacks on Israeli
interests in Mombasa. Kenya is also concerned about the flow of small arms,
primarily from Somalia into its territory, and especially into urban areas.
Link with Islamic fundamentalism, a lack of central authority in Somalia
and a long history of irredentism within its own ethnic Somali population
lead Nairobi to view Somali refugees through a security prism.
The presence of armed elements in westem Tanzania and allegations that
refugee camps serve as a political and military bases for Burundian rebel
groups have led to open hostilities, including a cross-border exchange of
mortar fire, between Tanzania and Burundi. Politicians and police have raised
concerns over a perceived rise in urban gun-crime resulting from the flow
of small arms from Burundi. Consequently, the Tanzanian goverrunent has
increased restrictions on Burundian refugees, is pushing for early repatria-
tion, and has adopted the official policy that refugees should be restricted to
s#e havens in their country of origin.
Indirect threats
Incases like Tanzania, structural adjustmentprogrammeshaveeliminatedfree
access to health and education for local populations. Such services, howeve4,
are still provided free of charge to refugees. Tensions result. Competition over
scarce resources, especially in the context of dedining donor engagement
in protracted refugee situations, can also be a source
of conflict between refugees and the local population.
More generally, the presence of refugees can exacerbate
previously existing ethnic antagonisms and change the
balance of power between groups in the host country.
This concern about ethnic balance was made explicit
in Macedonia's reluctance to accept Kosovar Albanian
refugees in March aggg."s Such indirect security conse-
quences are potentially on the same scale as more direct threats.
But not all refugees are seen as threats. The question of which are, and
why, may be partially answered by whether they are perceived as members
of the local political community or as outsiders. Indeed,
inthe Third World, the remarkable receptivity provided to millions of Afghans
in Pakistan and harp to ethnickin fromBulgaria in Turkey, to Ethiopians inthe
Sudan, to Ogadeni Ethiopians inSomalia to southem Sudanese in Ugand4 to
Issaq Somali in Djibouti and to Mozambicans in Malawi has been facilitated
by the ethnic and linguistic draracteristics they share with their hosts.b
The importance of affinity and shared group identity cannotbe overstated.
If a host community perceives the incoming refugee as 'one of us', then posi
tive and generous conceptions of distributive justice will apply. The empirical
evidence is overwhelming.
Conversely, if refugees are seenas members of an'outgtoup', they arelikely
to receive a hostile reception. In cases where there is a division along ethnic,
linguistic or religious lines,'a major population influx can place precariously
balanced multi-ethnic societies under great strain and may even threaten the
political balance of power'. hrdeed refugees, 'as an out group can be blamed
for all untoward activities'."2 While crime rates may rise only in proportion to
the rise in population" refugees increasingly €ue seen as the cause, and can also
be blamed for poverly, unemployment, scarcity of resources and disease.d
These dynamics have been evident in the dramatic restrictions on asylum
thathave been imposed by host states in Africa since the mid-r99os. Numerous
reports have pointed to the absence of meaningful burden-sharing and
growing xenophobia in many African countries as the key factors motivating
restrictive asylum policies.'r Rather ironically, these xenophobic sentiments
have emerged at a time when most of Africa is democratizing and govern-
ments are compelled to take into account public opinion in formulating
various policies. The result has been the adoption of anti-refugee plat-
forms by political parties which result in anti-refugee policies and actions
by govemments.m
Just as politicians in Westem Europe have recently faced increasing pressure
to restrict entry, 'the rise of multiparty democrary in Africa ... has argu-
ably diminished the autonomy of state elites in determining the security
agenda'.:r For example, the Tanzanian govemment's decision to close its
border with Burundi was closely linked to the lead-up to the ry95 parlia-
mentary and presidential elections. Opposition parties exploited local
dissatisfaction with the govemmenfs handling of the asylum question and
tried to demonstrate that they had the power to restore order and stability
to border regions by expelling unpopular refugee populations.r"
The presence of large numbers of refugees inastate's periphery maygtve
that region a new significance. This is particularly true when the political
geography of many African states is considered.r Unlike European states,
the power of African states is concentrated in economic centres; control over
the periphery is limited. The presence of large refugee populations in these
'hinterlands', where the regime typically does not exercise effective control
and where there is 'space for challengers to form large and sophisticated
rebel armies',Y is a serious concern.
Whatto do
The causes and consequences of refugee-related security concems are
diverse; responses must be varied. hr the short term, direct security concerns
mustbe addressed through supporting the (highly complex) separation and
exclusion of armed elements within the refugee population.35 Specific disar-
mament measures/ such as I-IN arms embargos, have to be enforced. Arms
surpluses have to be collected; militias and warlords have to be demobilised
and 
- 
in some cases 
- 
integrated into the national army and police; and arms
syndicates and networks need to be broken.
Since 1998, UNHCRhas developed a range of operational responses to deal
with the problem of militarisation of refugee camps. Security experts have been
deployed into selected African camps. hr 1998 a'security package'was imple-
mented in western Tanzania that involved material support and training to
local police.36 UNHCR also moved Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugee carnps
in Guinea further from the border to protect refugees from attacks by armed
elements, and supported the Guinean govemment in the formation of a special
security force 
- 
whidr received training from Canadian federal police officers
- 
to patrol these camps.37 While these actions helped create greater security for
some of the refugee carnps and communities in Timzania and Guine4 they have
not uniformly led to greater peace in the wider refugee-populated aleas.:8 A
similar effort by UNHCR and the LN Deparhnent of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in mid-zoor successfully
separated armed elements from refugees.ar
The future of such security initiatives depends on the practical partner-
ships and'security packages'that UNHCR is able to form with the DPKO,
govemments and regional organisations. While discussions between DPKO
and UNHCR have set the groundwork for future cooperation between
the two offices, serious differences of approach and political and resource
constraints remain. LINHCR and other humanitarian aid organisations fear
that too close an association with the military compromises their imparti-
ality and neutrality, while governments are reluctant to authorise military
forces for such functions. Protection for refugees in militarised situations
also depends critically on the willingness and ability of host states and
countries of origin to observe intemational humanitarian norms regarding
the treatrnent of refugees and non-combatants.
hr the last two years the number of UN peacekeeping operations in
Africa has increased dramatically. The UN Security Council has author-
ised new missions in Liberia and Burundi, strengthened existing ones in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and authorised a large-scale mission
to Sudan to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace accord
signed at the end of zoo4. These missions are overwhelmingly staffed by
troops from developing countries and many commentators feel the UN is
dangerously overstretched in its peacekeeping operations.
Sudr African missions are so-called'complex peacekeeping operations',
involving multiple tasks and combining military and civilian components.4o
Building up regional peacekeeping capabilities goes hand in hand with
development initiatives to help restore stability in war-torn regions. But,
as Mats Berdal points out neither the DPKO nor under-resourced peace-
keeping forces from developing countries have adequate capacity (especially
in logistics) to sustain this level of multiple operations effectively.+'
One effort to fill this gap is the agreement at the June zoo4 European Union
summitinBrusselstocreate,byzooT,aforceof 13battlegroups,eachr,5oostrong
dedicated to intervening mainly inAfrican conflicts and deployable within 5-
ro days of political decisionby the EU Council. The force would be'explicitly
butnotexclusively'mandated to intervenebythe UN Security Council or atthe
request of a govemment, and would be expected to enforce a cease-fire and deal
with acivil or humanitarian emergenry for a shortperiod until aUN orAfrican
Union peacekeeping force could be deployed. The UK and Canada have offered
to trainAfrican Union forces for deployment as peacekeepers and stabilisation
forces in several African conflicts. While these initiatives would undoubtedly
dealwith some of the root causes of refugee movemenb in countries of origin,
greater efforb are required to improve conditions for long-standing refugee
populations in regions in conflict and host countries.cr
Unlike direct threats, indirect threats are best addressed in the short to
medium term through development initiatives and targeted assistance to
alleviate the burden of hosting refugees on local communities and to ease
tensions between refugees and the local community. Most ofterL these inter-
ventions can be small scale and highly focused. Field research by one of the
authors in Kenya and Tanzania in early zoo4 illustrates how such initiatives
can play a role in addressing the security implications of refugee move-
ments. LINHCR introduced a series of measures in Kenya in the late r99os,
including a mobile court system to try those suspected of criminal offences,
additional support to the Kenyan police to substantially increase their pres-
ence in and around the camps at Dadaab, and the'firewood project'.
The firewood project was designed to provide refugees with 3o% of
their firewood needs, with the objective of reducing the exposure of refugee
women to sexual violence by reducing the amount of time they would be
required to spend in the insecure areas around the camps. The six years
following the introduction of the firewood project in 1998 witressed a
dramatic decline not only in the number of reported rapes in the three
Dadaab camps, but also in murder and armed robbery.+r The UN and NGOs
working in Dadaab believe that this improvement in refugee security and
the dramatic decline in violent crime is ovenvhelmingly the result of the
firewood project and its positive secondary benefits: creating jobs for the
local population and encouraing young men who would otherwise pursue
banditry to participate in the more lucrative trade in firewood.
To take another example, under the Special Programmes for Refugee
Affected Areas (SPRAAs) in Tanzania and Local Assistance Programmes
in Kenya assistance is targeted to the local community living near refugee
carnps, to not only mitigate the impact of a large refugee populatioru but also
to demonstrate to the local population the tangible benefits of hosting refu-
gees. The positive effects of SPRAAs have been most striking in Kibondo.
UNHCR and NGOs have spent over $r.z5m in Tanzania's Kibondo
District alone in a range of programmes, including rehabilitation of roads
used by aid convoys, improvement of water supply to local communi-
ties, development of local communication infrastruchrre, building of
local schools and health centres, and planting of trees. A recent report by
Tanzanian researchers which assesses the cost of hosting refugees against
the benefits that have accrued to the local populatiorU both directly through
the SPRAAs and indirectly through the creation of employment and larger
markets, concludes that the refugees have generally been a benefit.++
Seemingly modest activities such as SPRAAs and the firewood project
have clearly contributed to an improved security and protection environ-
ment in Kenya and Tanzania, reducing competition between refugees
and the local population over scarce resources and mitigating local griev-
ances towards refugees. Such programmes, and the presence of refugees
and refugee progranmes more generally, could 
- 
if effectively managed
- 
contribute significantly to longer-term local and national development.+r
The World Bank notes three dimensions of poverty: lack of income
and assets; voicelessness and powerlessness in the institutions of state and
society; and vulnerability to adverse shocks. UNHCR argues that refugees
suffer from all three conditions and that poverty can also lead refugees to
a range of negative survival tactics 
- 
many of which affect local host popu-
lations 
- 
such as the degradation of the environment, prostitution, petty
theft and child labour.+6 Development progrturunes can play a key role in
addressing some of these indirect security burdens, in particular providing
safety nets that relieve refugees of the need to resort to these tactics.
Comprehensive solutions to protracted refugee situations
Such measures c€m only help m.rnage the situation until a resolution can be
found; they cannot be a substitute for a solution. The full range of possible
solutions for refugees include repatriation and reintegratiorl local integra-
tion in the host country and resettlement to a third country.
Western donor goverrunents could play a significant role in eadr of
these three solutions. For example, they could support retum and reintegra-
tion through local and regional post-conflict reconstruction progrilmmes,
rehabilitation of former combatants and income-generation progranunes
in support of demobilisation. So far, with
the very recent exception of southem Sudan,
donor governments have responded poorly to
recent funding appeals addressing the most
prominent African long-term refugee situa-
tions. UNHCR hosted a series of meetings in
early March zoo4 to generate international
support for the repatriation of a number of
African refugee populations. It argued that
conditions in countries such as Somalia Liberia, Burundi, Sierra Leone and
Angola were suitable for large-scale returns in the coming years, pending
positive developments in the various peace processes and in the ability of
LINHC& partner UN agencies and NGOs to build the necessary capacity
in the countries of origin. When the UNHCR appealed in March zoo4 for
funding to prepare for the retum and reintegration in several African
countries, it received only lukewarrn support. While repatriation to all the
countries listed in the UNCR appeal may not be immediately possible, such
prior investment is essential to ensure that the infrastructure is in place
when conditions are right.
Lr additioru donor goverrunents could support local integration by
targeting assistance to refugee-populated areas and by supporting self-suffi-
cienry initiatives for locally seftled refugees. Sustained donor commitrnent
to refugee integration prograrnmes and a better understanding of political
and economic constraints on many host states would encourage hosts to be
more generous and innovative. Unfortunately, at present although seven
out of ten refugees are located in developing countries, assistance for them
is low and erratic. Reversing this trend would be the first step to convincing
over-burdened host countries to offer permanent legal stafus as a comple-
ment to self-sufficiency.
Governments also need to expand their overseas resettlement
progxammes. An adverse effect of rr September and the 'war on terror'
has been heightened screening and a dramatic reduction in the number
of refugees who are resettled in the West. The United States, the world's
largest resettlement country, aimed to receive 7o,ooo refugees in fiscal-year
zoo3lzoo4 (down from gqooo in zooo artd t4z,ooo in rggz), but only 52,868
were actually reseftled. Ir additioru European states resettle fewer than 5,ooo
refugees a year. As a result, many refugees are left stranded in camps.
Finally, the highly selective nature of most donor funding for refugee
situations requires dramatic correction. A recent study of the behaviour
of donor govemnents argues that funding for humanitarian programmes
largely reflects the foreign and domestic policies of donor govemments.4T
Suchbehaviour does notprovide a coherent or effective systemfor financing
international humanitarian activities. Donor goverrunents give vastly
disproportionate amounts of aid to a few well-lrrown cases and far less
aid to dozens of other less well-publicised refugee caseloads. The absence
of an autonomous and government-assessed resource base for UNHC&
for example, continues to limit the response to present and future crises.
While UNHCR has recently tried to overcome these financial constraints by
accessing development funds to finance unmet needs, the results are not yet
clear. Donor goverrunents need to work towards a strengthened multilat-
eral regime which has the mandate, capacity and resources to meet refugee
needs in a more impartial and effective manner.
br the past, comprehensive approaches and greater external engagement
in regions of refugee origin have proven to be the most effective way of
resolving not only long-standing refugee problems but sources of regional
instability. The United States and the international community employed a
broad range of policies in the r96os to resolve the protracted and seemingly
insoluble situations of displaced persons still in camps in Europe nearly zo
years after the Second World War, and from the late r98os to the mid-r99os
in SoutheastAsia to deal with the protracted Vietramese refugee problem.+e
The benefits of a comprehensive approach in many regions of the world are
potentially equally great today.
Recent major initiatives have focused on the Burundian and Somali
refugee situations. The governments of Burundi and Tanzania have been
working closely, since 1993, with UNHCR, through a Tripartite Agreement,
to facilitate the repatriation of thousands of Burundian refugees in western
Tanzania beginning in zooz. According to a UNHCR report of.lune zoo4,
almost ago,ooo refugees had refurned under this programme, some 5olooo
in the first six months of zoo4 alone.+s Simultaneously, there have been
long-term political negotiations, based in Arush4 Tanzarri+ and guided
by respected African leaders such as Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandel+
to resolve the ongoing conflict between the government in Bujumbura and
a range of rebel factions. One of the primary objectives of these talks has
been the holding of national elections in Burundi and the establishment of a
government representing the various political and ethnic interests.
Both Tanzania and Burundi see repatriation as the only viable solu-
tion for the protracted refugee population in western Tanzania. However,
repatriation alone will not resolve the problem. During the past 30 years/
Burundi has experienced several violent upheavals in which hundreds of
thousands of refugees have fled across Tanzania's borders. Repeated repa-
triations during this period have not proven to be sustainable. The causes of
Burundi's recurring ethnic violence have notbeen fundamentally addressed
in the recent negotiations, and so it is unlikely that the ongoing mass tetutn
of refugees to the densely populated and ethnically divisive country will
be sustainable. It may, in fact, contribute to increased instability, notwith-
standing the presence of some 5,ooo UN peacekeepers.
The case of Burundi underscores the need for a well-integrated political
and humanitarian approach to protracted refugee situations, in which polit-
icaf strategic, economic and humanitarian initiatives are complementary
and focus on corunon objectives. Some progress to this end has been made
in the formulation of a comprehensive solution for the protracted Somali
refugee situation.
Somalia has been largely neglected by the intemational community
since the withdrawal of US forces ,r, ry%.It has one of the lowest human
development indexes in the world, and a desperate humanitarian sifua-
tion. Out of a population of approximately 7m people, some 4oo,ooo are
estimated to be internally displaced. Although around one million refu-
gees have retumed in the past decade, most live in conditions of absolute
poverty. UN programmes for Somalia are seriously underfunded and are
forced to base their operations in neighbouring countries. The presence of
international agencies within Somalia itself is negligible. Recently, however,
there has been some renewed international interest in restoring stability and
initiating a comprehensive solution for the Somali long-term refugee popu-
lation. The Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, jan Egland,
visited Somalia in Decembet 2oo4, marking the first visit of a high-level UN
official to the country in over a decade.
Beginning in zoo4, UNHCR initiated an international effort to try to
establish a comprehensive plan of action (CPA) for Somali refugees.so This
initiative includesmostof themajor stakeholders, includingthenewlyestab-
Iished Somali government, host govemments in the regiorg the European
Commissioru UNHCR and the co-sponsors of the action plan, Denmarl
Netherlands and the tlK. The steering group does not include Somaliland or
Puntland. With seed funding from the European Commission, the steering
group will develop a plan of actioru to be approved for funding at a special
inter-govemmental meeting in mid-zoo5.
The effort to create a Somali refugee CPAis seen as a test case for solving
other protracted refugee situations. At present, given the continuing insta-
bility in southern and central Somali+ the focus of the CPA is repatriation to
Somaliland and Puntland, where conditions for retumees are more secure
than in southern and central Somalia. However, in order for returns to be
sustained there needs to be increased emphasis on reintegration and post-
conflict recovery. Another possibility is to tap into development funds to
provide stability in areas of retum, although funds for reintegration are
limited and donor appeals for Somali returns have been seriously under-
subscribed. For example, less than half of the $zoom for the zoo4 Somalia
repatriation appeal has been pledged so far.
The second objective of the CPA is to examine how human-rights and
economic conditions for Somali refugees canbe improved in host countries
such as Kenya, Ethiopia Yemen and Djibouti. A number of studies will be
undertaken by local experts in the region to determine the protection and
assistance gaps that need to be addressed in any future projects within the
CPA. Finally, the European co-sponsors are particularly interested in exam-
ining ways to mitigate irregular movements of Somalis to the West given
that Somalis have constituted one of the largest nationalities seeking asylum
in Europe over the past decade.
After 13 years of negotiations, the Mbaguthi Peace Process in Nairobi
resulted in the November zoo4 election of Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as Somalia's
new president. The composition of a full cabinet was finally agreed in early
2oo5. The formation of a new goverunent does not, howevel, promise stability.
Somaliland does not recognise the new government, and there appears to be
substantial opposition from the Islamic courts and rival clans. As a result of
this opposition and prevailing instabiliry the govemment has not been able
to sit in Mogadishrl but remains in Kenya. Proposals for an African Union
stabilisation force to provide security for the new govemment are contingent
upon the establishment of the govemment in Mogadishu. There is little likeli-
hood of such a deployment in the foreseeable future.
brsecurity remains rife; many leaders of warring factions continue to
profit personally from conditions of instability. As a result, most aid agen-
cies have pulled out of the country. hrtermittent fighting arnong rival clans
in central and southern Somalia has caused scores of deaths and injuries.
There are also cases of more targeted violence: in ]anuary zoo5t the police
chief of Mogadishu, who supported the retum of the new govemment and
the deployment of a stabilisation force, was murdered.
The need for an integrated approach
Instability in Somali+ like the security situation in Burundi, underscores
the need for'joined-up'intemational policies to address the long-standing
security implications of protracted refugee situations and humanitarian
emergencies. While the Somali refugee CPA is a commendable effort to
engage the international community on a particularly difficult and complex
protracted refugee situation, it does not adequately link humanitarian
factors with the underlying and crucially important economic, political and
security factors. A solution for the Somali situation requires the restoration
of a degree of stability and normality in southern and central Somali4 after
more than a decade of instability.
The principal wealness of the Somali refugee CPA is that it remains
divorced from the political developments surrounding the return to
Mogadishu of the newly elected government. The CPA primarily focuses
on repatriation to Somalia and improving conditions in Somalia in order
to ensure that refugee refums are sustainable. However, the lessons from
past comprehensive plans of actiory such as those in Indochina and Central
America are that humanitarian efforts must be closely linked to political and
diplomatic initiatives. Previous CPAs also required the active involvement
of countries of origin so that internal conflicts and refugee problems would
not reoccur. Crucially, successful CPAs relied on external political initiatives
that laid the foundations for humanitarian and development programmes.
Without strong political support and successful peace negotiations there is
little immediate prospect of resolving protracted refugee situations such
as in Somali or Burundi. Somalia and Burundi need stable central govern-
ments, but new political roots require considerable external support to take
hold. This means not only humanitarian aid but security and peacekeeping
assistance that includes training and equipping a new independent police
force and army, and disarming and demobilising warring factions.
The problem of Somali refugees would be a good place to begin. In
this case in particular, there are strong security and political reasons for
acting now. Unlike other African refugee popula-
tions, Somalis have migrated across the world and
established themselves in communities in Europe
and North America, creating a pull factor for new
groups of Somali emigrants. Consequently, several EU
govemments have sought to find ways both to contain
those flows and to refurn failed asylum seekers, if not
directly to Somalia, then to Somaliland or Puntland
where conditions are slightly better. Somalia has also
been the target of UN alms sanctions, which have
unsuccessfully tried to curb the flow of small arms
from Somalia across the region. Thus, there exist strong incentives for EU
and NorthAmerican governments to support a combined political-human-
itarian initiative to resolve the problem.
Yet the overall response of international policymakers remains compart-
mentalised. Security, development and humanitarian issues are discussed
in different forums, each with their own theoretical frameworks, institu-
tional arrangements and independent policy approaches. Neither the
UN nor donor goverrunents have adequately integrated the resolution of
recurring regional refugee problems with the promotion of economic and
political development, conflict resolution and sustainable peace and secu-
rity. Lrtemational involvement in nation-building, reconstruction and
rehabilitation in war-torn regions is still piecemeal and under-resourced.
There is a pressing need to develop a policy agenda that extends beyond
conventional boundaries and seeks to integrate the resolution of chronic
and recurring regional refugee problems with economic development and
security issues.
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